Suez 1956 : an overview

Tom Adams MBE

Just over half a century ago as the Hungarian Revolution was drawing headlines and a Presidential election was being run in the United States of America, the Suez intervention caught world attention. Frequently seen in Britain as a crisis it marked the eclipse of British world power and revealed a darker side to British political behaviour of collusion and deceit.

Introduction

The Suez Canal is a 163km (101-mile) waterway between the Mediterranean Sea at Port Said and the Red Sea at Suez. By reducing the need to circumnavigate the African continent via the Cape of Good Hope this largely manmade waterway became one of the world’s principal inter-ocean trade routes. Historically it was Britain’s main artery to India and the Empire. So strategically important that British armed forces were frequently stationed there until 1956.

The first ships transit the Suez Canal

History of the canal commences in the late 18th century when Napoleon conquered Egypt and ordered a ‘feasibility study’. In 1854 Ferdinand de Lesseps, the French counsel in Cairo, gained a concession from Mohammed Said Pasha, the Viceroy of Egypt, to create a company with the purpose of building and operating a shipping canal to connect the Mediterranean to the Red Sea. The Suez Canal Company (Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez) was created in December 1856. Financed by French private investors and the Egyptian government it was based in Alexandria but its legal entity and administration were based in Paris.

A Suez Canal Share Certificate

At this time de Lesseps obtained a second concession that stated ‘the canal and the ports dependent on it shall be forever open, as neutral passages, to all merchant ships…on payment of dues and observance of the regulations’. Interestingly no mention was made of warships.

Egyptians were forced to work on the excavation of the Canal by a working practice that was actually in use in Egypt since the era of the Pharaohs. Over 11 years it is believed that some 1.5 million people worked on the project and over 125,000 perished. The Canal, owned and operated by the Suez Canal Company, opened, with the approval of the Sultan of Turkey, to international traffic on 17 November 1869. In 1870-71 French and German warships freely used the Canal and in 1873 the Canal was declared open to the passage of warships of different states even in time of hostilities. In 1875 the British Government of Benjamin Disraeli bought Egypt’s share in the Canal Company. As a major shareholder, Britain declared in 1877, during the Russo-Turkish war, that any attempt to blockade the Canal would be regarded by Her Majesty’s Government as a menace to India. In 1882, during a civil war in Egypt, British troops moved in to protect the Canal. By October 1888 the Suez Canal Convention (known as the Convention of Constantinople and signed by Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Spain, Russia and Turkey) formally declared the Canal a neutral zone in peace and war and open to all merchant ships and warships. As a strategic asset the British authorities assumed control and defence of the canal during World War One. Under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance (1936) defence was entrusted to British forces stationed across 37 military installations in the vicinity of the Canal – the Suez Canal Zone. During the Italian-Abyssinian war the Canal was left open to Italian warships. Britain’s Foreign Secretary at the time (Anthony Eden) said “the Canal could not have been closed except by action on behalf of the League of Nations”. During World War Two the security of the Zone was stoutly defended by Britain’s North African campaign.

In 1951, Egypt repudiated the 1936 treaty. There followed riots and civil unrest in the Canal Zone in what became for three year the Suez Canal Zone Emergency. During 1952 an Egyptian army-led coup overthrew King Farouk’s Government and replaced him with General Mohammed Naguid, however, shortly afterwards Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser stepped in as the head of state. This new government displayed an independent and Arab nationalist identity, developing trading ties with the Soviet Union, links with Soviet culture, recognition of the People’s Republic of China and began receiving Communist aid including arms. Nasser’s support for Algerian nationalism annoyed the French and both Britain and the United States of America stopped selling arms to Egypt. Through support of the Fedayeen tension increased between Israel and her Arab neighbours. In 1954 Britain agreed to pull out of the Canal Zone by June 1956.

Nationalisation of the Canal

13 June 1956 saw Britain complete her withdrawal of troops and the Suez Canal Zone reverted to Egypt. Shortly afterwards on 19 July the USA informed Egypt that contrary to previous intentions they would not be making a multi-million dollar loan for construction of the Aswan High Dam on the Nile. A British loan, that was conditional on the American loan being made, was withdrawn the following day together with a substantial World Bank loan.

Within days (26 July) President Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal, seizing British and French assets and placed the management under his Suez Canal Authority. Canal dues were to be used to finance building of the Aswan dam. The Egyptians said they would compensate the stockholders of the Suez Canal Company but would not accept any international control of the canal while guaranteeing the right of access for all ships, except those of Israel. It is recorded that hundreds of British residents were detained. In the meantime the Soviet Union and its allies supported Egypt and offered substantial aid for the Aswan dam project.

This nationalisation provoked a strong reaction from the previous owners Britain and France. Anthony Eden, the ailing British Prime Minister, called the nationalisation ‘theft’ and wished to launch military intervention at once. Owing to the state of military unpreparedness and the practical non-existence of any Combined Operations he was told that it simply was not possible. Britain and France froze Egyptian assets, British reservists were recalled and military preparations began in the Mediterranean region. Planning what was to be largely a seaborne operation on this scale proved to be long drawn out. Cyprus was inadequate as a naval base and Malta had to be used. An Anglo-French Command was established on the basis that the supreme leadership should be British and inter-service command at ‘theatre level’. For example, Britain’s 16th Parachute Brigade was brought up to strength and together with the 3rd Commano Brigade made ready for a major operation; the French made ready a parachute and ‘fast mechanised’ division and three Marine Commandoes. Royal Navy preparations were partially steered by the stage then reached in the modernization programme of aircraft carriers. 105 RN and RFA ships were assembled.

The 38 RFA ships which were deployed were –

A further 8 troopships and over 60 merchant ships and transport ferries were requisitioned to augment the RFA ships

Troopship Dilwara

The French Navy contributed the battleship JEAN BART, two carriers ARROMANCHES and LA FAYETTE, the cruiser GEORGES LEYGUES and a number of destroyers, escorts, minesweepers and support ships

Records now show that the Lord Chancellor’s private view to the Prime Minister Eden was that an operation against Egypt would be legal. However, Law Officers of the Crown (the Government’s legal advisers) were not consulted about any operation and threatened to resign

Within the US political machine, two powerful brothers – John Foster Dulles (Secretary of State) and Allen Dulles (Director of the CIA) were busy and history shows they were certainly not on the side of Britain and France

Publicly the US opposed the nationalisation but also they opposed any use of Anglo-French forces to reclaim it. In the months that followed the United Sates arranged international conferences, proposed a Suez Canal Users’ Association but, possibly because of some contradictory dealings, this all failed to reduce the tension

Meanwhile Eden and Selwyn Lloyd, his Foreign Secretary, colluded with France and Israel and concealed this from the Cabinet, Parliament and the USA. On 22 October 1956 there was a meeting at senior British, French and Israeli ministerial level and then two days later a very secret military planning meeting took place at Sèvres outside Paris. A summary of this meeting was typed in French and three copies were initialed by the French Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister of Israel and by a senior British Foreign Office official. The following day, at the request of Eden, a meeting was hastily arranged at Quai D’Orsay where it was proposed to destroy the papers of the previous day. The very existence of this document (the Sèvres Protocol) has been revealed only in recent years and the British copy has not survived in official records. This Protocol reportedly laid out a tripartite military operation against Egypt. The plan being that Israel would invade Egypt and the Canal Zone and that Britain and France would subsequently intervene, encourage Israeli and Egyptian forces to withdraw ten miles (16 km) from either bank of the canal and then place an Anglo-French Intervention Force in the Canal Zone. This was to be Operation Musketeer, to the French Operation Mousquetaire and to the Israelis Operation Kadesh.

Operation Musketeer 

On the evening of 29 October Israel Defence Forces launched an attack on Egyptian positions in the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. The following day London and Paris, as pre-planned, issued an ultimatum to Israel and Egypt for cessation of hostilities and that troops were to withdraw to positions ten miles on either side of the Canal.

The Egyptians would then allow British and French troops to be stationed within the Canal Zone to preserve the international waterway.

The Egyptian Government rejected the terms.

While the carrier and amphibious forces planned to sail across the Mediterranean from Malta, under the guise of an Anglo-French training exercise, the Royal Air Force planned a four-day bombing and leaflet dropping campaign. On 31 October this first phase commenced when Anglo-French aircraft attacked military airfields in the Canal Zone and Nile Delta.

On Monday 5 November the second phase commenced with the Anglo-French invasion. Operation Cordage, parachute drop by over 1,000 men of 16 Parachute Brigade on the airfield at Gamil; a simultaneous drop by the French 2e régiment de Parachutist Coloniaux on Port Fuad and Operation Telescope, an Anglo-French seaborne landing on Port Said and on the opposite bank at Port Fuad [1].

The most notable event of the day being the execution of the first helicopter landing by 415 Royal Marines from 45 Commando with 23 tons of stores in an improvised group of Whirlwinds and Sycamores operating from the carriers HMS THESEUS and HMS OCEAN.

The operation was overshadowed by widespread international condemnation including from the Commonwealth countries of Australia, Canada and New Zealand. US President Dwight D Eisenhower was very opposed to the invasion. Saudi Arabia had introduced an oil embargo against both Britain and France; petrol rationing was introduced. The United States threatened Britain’s gold reserve and the economically important link between the US dollar and the Pound Sterling. They also blocked a British request for a loan from the International Monetary Fund. Nasser appeared to have a new ally in the form of ‘rocket threats’ from the Soviet leader Khrushchev.

At the United Nations, Canadian External Affairs Minister Lester B Pearson, proposed a solution that was to later gain him the 1957 Nobel Peace Prize. He proposed for the British and French to withdraw and allow for a UN Force in the Canal Zone so stabilising the situation. On 4 November the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution that called for an immediate ceasefire. Britain was unhappy with the resolution but did not reject it out of hand. On 7 November a ceasefire was agreed and the UN adopted a final resolution that Anglo-French forces quit the Canal Zone and be replaced by a UN Emergency Force (UNEF) to supervise the area. This force of 6,000 men from ten countries appropriately under the command of Canadian General E L Burns; astonishingly the Egyptians appeared reluctant to accept Canadian troops on their soil.

The handover was completed by 24 December. Israel hung on to its positions in the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba until March 1957 when its forces were replaced by UN troops. Owing to 22 damaged and sunken block ships in the Suez Canal and the Bitter Lakes, the waterway was closed.

RFA Sea Salvor alongside one of the block ships engaged in her salvage

Despite being hampered by Egyptian political issues a UN appointed salvage team finally cleared the Canal by April 1957 [2].

The role of the US Navy’s Sixth Fleet was also interesting. Admiral Walter Boone, Commander US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, ordered the Sixth Fleet to assist in the evacuation of American nationals from both Israel and Egypt. They had two carriers – USS CORAL SEA and USS RANDOLPH – operating in the area. It is reported that early in the morning of 4 November the CORAL SEA passed through the middle of the British task group although they had been ordered to ‘keep clear of foreign operational areas’. There are many recorded ‘movements’ of US surface vessels unnecessarily close to Anglo-French units and going into Alexandria. US submarines and carrier-borne aircraft were also a problem for the Anglo-French air and anti-submarine defences. The British Flag Officer Aircraft Carriers believed that the Sixth Fleet was deliberately obstructing his operations. France, Israel and Egypt were bound by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 when the fighting started. Britain, while not having ratified the Conventions told the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that it would apply them. The ICRC was active with all four countries and arranged broadcasts in various languages calling for all to ensure that wounded and sick be cared for, for medical units and transport to be protected from attack and for civilians and prisoners to be treated humanely.

Less known is that after the start of the conflict Egyptian authorities accused the 55,000 Jews living in Egypt of collusion with the enemy. Their businesses were nationalised, property confiscated they were threatened with expulsion.

Despite political and logistical conditions imposed by Egypt the multinational, multi-racial UNEF helped keep Middle East peace along the Egyptian-Israeli border and the Sinai coast until 1967 when Egypt demanded that they leave. Their withdrawal contributed to the outbreak of the next Arab-Israeli war – the infamous Six-Days War – when the canal was again closed and remained so until mid – 1975. Between January and September 1957 the ICRC chartered 14 ships to transport more than 7,000 people out of Egypt prior to them mostly resettling in Israel. Eden recognizing his physical and temperamental unsuitability to continue as Prime Minister resigned on 10 January 1957. Distrust in the aftermath of Suez had a weakening effect on the North Atlantic Alliance leading to France withdrawing her military forces from NATO. The United Kingdom and Egypt did not restore diplomatic relations until 1969

Is there a parallel to be drawn between the Anglo-French action in Suez (1956) and US action in Vietnam (1959-75) and the steadfast British and French refusal to become involved or lend support to the Americans?

Battle honours and medals 

The British did not officially issue a ‘battle honour’ for Suez 1956.

110 honours and awards to the Royal Navy and Royal Marines directly relating to Operation Musketeer and the follow up work of the UK Salvage Unit were published in the London Gazette of 13 June 1957. No medal was struck to mark this event. The Naval General Service Medal (NGS) 1915-1962 with its crimson and white striped ribbon that was instituted to mark service in minor naval operations does apply with a ‘Near East’ clasp to recognise service between 30 October and 22 December 1956

Naval General Service Medal with the Near East clasp

Notes

[1] The spelling of Port Fuad varies and the modern spelling is Port Fouad.

[2] Admiralty Coastal Salvage Vessels by Dave Sowdon; chapter four covers the story of the salvage operation to reopen the Suez Canal.

Sources

Primary

ADM1/26760 Suez Canal – UK salvage unit and support of UN salvage team (TheNational Archive)

ADM116/6103 Interim Report on Operation Musketeer (The National Archive)

ADM116/6111 Suez – Salvage operations (The National Archive)

CAB134/4107 Nationalisation of the Suez Canal, 1956, volume 1 (The National Archive)